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COLLEGIALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY
Tobias Barrington Wolff*
This Essay is a direct transcription of the remarks that I offered at the
Fordham Law School Symposium out of which this volume grows. I have
made very minor edits to remove superfluous words and verbal tics, and I
have restructured a pair of sentences for clarity, but I have otherwise left
the transcript intact as delivered. I did not originally plan to publish these
remarks and spoke without notes, so I beg the reader’s indulgence. In
preparing this transcript for publication, I have added what I consider to be
the bare minimum of footnotes, principally to account properly for my
discussion of the work of other scholars.
What I want to spend my time talking about today is a more serious
issue, an issue that is very personal for me. It is the deep tension that exists
for LGBT scholars and lawyers who work on these issues between
principles of collegiality and basic principles of individual and human
dignity.
By principles of collegiality, what I mean is not just the social politeness
and nicety that we try to abide by in the Academy, but also what I see as a
particular feature of academic collegiality that is important to the
profession. We, as scholars, come to fellow scholars with a strong
presumption that the ideas that our fellow scholars are articulating and
exploring are entitled to be “treated with” in a serious fashion—are entitled
to be accorded a presumption of good-faith effort to sort through a set of
difficult ideas, even when we come to different conclusions and have strong
disagreements with our colleagues. I think that there are at least two
reasons why we embrace that norm of collegiality within the profession.
One is a scholarly reason: it is a norm that reinforces the mindset of a
serious academic or a serious scholar in being prepared to question ideas, in
being prepared always to revisit one’s own conclusions despite one’s own
certainty about those conclusions.

* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful for the
opportunity to publish these remarks, and to Professor Joe Landau for his hard work and
good judgment, and I thank Peter Pazzaglini for his intellectual inspiration, spiritual
guidance and irreplaceable friendship. I dedicate this address to the millions of courageous
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning Americans who must struggle with these
issues every day without the privilege of the Academy to augment their voices and the safety
of tenure to guard them from harm.
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But it also reflects what I think is one of the characteristic challenges of
doing serious scholarly work. The effort to undertake a sustained analysis
of difficult issues over time and to articulate those ideas in writing or in
presentations like this, to submit oneself for criticism, is not just an
intellectually difficult endeavor; it is an emotionally difficult endeavor. I
think that scholars—it is something that we don’t talk about a lot in the
profession, but I think it is a challenging and threatening thing to do the
work that we do and to try to do it well and to try to do it in a responsible
fashion. The norm of collegiality is in part a recognition of that dynamic of
the work of a scholar: that it is difficult to explore ideas in a sustained
fashion, to present the results of one’s work and to submit one’s work for
criticism and the possibility that you’re going to be publicly proven wrong
or publicly shown not to be as clever as you would like people to think you
are, and so forth. That’s hard work. And I think that the norms of
collegiality are partly defined and enforced in order to reinforce the
scholarly norms of the profession but also to reinforce the ability of
scholars to do that work. These norms are very important to me and I take
them very seriously.
As a gay man and a scholar who works on these issues, I have found over
the past twelve years that I have been a full-time scholar that this norm
comes into conflict with some basic principles of individual and human
dignity for me—specifically, when I am encountering scholars who are
making arguments about me and about the ten million other Americans with
whom I share the experience of being an LGBT person that are
dehumanizing and that feel like, and I think by any objective standard
constitute, an assault upon one’s most basic sense of safety and belonging
in a civil community, and one’s most basic sense of being able to hold one’s
head up with a certain measure of dignity in these kinds of difficult
intellectual and scholarly and public policy discussions that we have. That
tension between those two important principles characterizes, certainly for
me and I think probably for a lot of LGBT scholars and lawyers as well, a
lot of the work that we do in this field. Let me say a couple of words
specifically about what I mean and the way that these arguments get
deployed in the field.
I will talk about three of the arguments that opponents of equal treatment
for gay and lesbian couples in general, and specifically with respect to
marriage, often rely upon. The first has to do with kids and the ability of
same-sex couples to be successful parents for their kids. You hear
constantly in public discourse, and you see constantly in litigation and in
public policy debates, arguments about how the reason why gay and lesbian
couples need to be excluded from the civil institution of marriage, and
indeed often from civil union and domestic partnership relationships as
well, is because we need to safeguard the best interests of children and
secure children a household in which they have both a mother and a father,
which is the ideal environment in which they can raise children. Professor
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Wardle has developed these arguments in some of his writing, and many
other scholars and lawyers in the field have talked about these arguments.1
Now, there are a number of things to say about this argument. The first,
which has been much discussed but is worth articulating once again, is that
these are arguments that fly in the face of all of the actual social science
experiments and evidence and empirical data which have attempted to
measure the question of what are the types of environments in which kids
do best and are most likely to come out well-adjusted and have successful
outcomes. It is the consensus of professional organizations that do this kind
of work, both psychiatric and child welfare organizations, that this is simply
a spurious argument and, indeed, there is a wealth of information and a
wealth of social science data making very clear that what matters to the
adjustment of kids and successful outcomes of kids is the nature of their
relationships with their parents, the nature of their parents’ relationships
with each other, and the economic and social resources that they have
available to them as kids, and that in fact the sex and the sexual orientation
of their parents makes absolutely no difference to the outcome of these
kids.2
You see a lot of scholars attempting to make the argument on the other
side by doing things like pointing to studies that simply study straight
couples—opposite-sex parents—and that point to various different deficits
that kids can experience when they are raised in various different forms of
problematic or challenged opposite-sex households in which one or another
parent is absent through divorce, or is disengaged because only a stepparent and not terribly invested in the children, and so forth. They point to
this and say, “See, this demonstrates that kids do best when they have a
1. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to
Their Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2011); Marriage Talking Points, NAT’L ORG.
MARRIAGE,
http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c.omL2KeN0LzH/b.4475595/k.566A/
Marriage_Talking_Points.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“Marriage is about bringing
together men and women so children can have mothers and fathers.”); see also Tracye
Hansen, Same-Sex Marriage: Not in the Best Interest of Children, THERAPIST, May/June
2009, available at http://www.drtraycehansen.com/Pages/writings_notinthebest.html.
Tracye Hansen describes herself as a “Psychologist, Cultural Commentator & Author,” id.,
and her work is promoted on the Ruth Institute website, which is a project of the National
Organization for Marriage website.
2. Professor Michael Lamb, Professor of Psychology and Head of the Department of
Social and Developmental Psychology at Cambridge University and one of the world’s
leading experts on child development and parental relationships, summarizes the state of the
social science and the consensus of serious professional and scholarly associations regarding
child welfare and gay parents in an affidavit that he submitted in conjunction with a
challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act brought in the Northern District of
California by Karen Golinski. See Declaration of Michael Lamb in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment & Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ & DefendantIntervenor’s Motions to Dismiss, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d
968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-0257-JSW), 2011 WL 7472740 [hereinafter Lamb
Declaration]. The Williams Institute at UCLA Law School has collected a significant
amount of the social science research and meta-analysis in the parenting section of its
electronic research center. See Parenting, WILLIAMS INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.
ucla.edu/category/research/parenting/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
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biological mother and a father. Therefore, same-sex couples should not be
allowed to get married.”3 Well, of course, that has nothing to do with the
question of whether same-sex couples can be successful parents. These are
studies that measure various different variations on opposite-sex
households, and they reinforce the notion that having successful outcomes
with your kids depends upon having engaged parents with good
relationships with their kids, parents who have good relationships with each
other, and parents who have access to resources, time, and status that allow
them to create a successful child-rearing environment for their children.
Indeed, to be perfectly blunt, scholars who attempt to point to these studies
about problems that various different kinds of heterosexual households have
as evidence that there is some reason why gay couples should not be
parenting kids, or should not be supported and reinforced in parenting their
kids, are either guilty of extraordinary incompetence or they are engaged in
willful misrepresentation of the data. There is no other way to describe the
way that these studies are being made use of.
That is a very important fact to discuss about the way in which these
social science data get used, but there are two issues that it is more
important to discuss. First of all, even if there were any truth to the
proposition that, on average, opposite-sex couples have better outcomes
with their kids than same-sex couples, why would that be a justification for
excluding same-sex couples from the various different kinds of state
support and state reinforcement that we offer to parents in order to help
ensure that they have successful outcomes for their kids? What we know is
that poor parents have much greater challenges having successful outcomes
with their kids and having well-adjusted kids because access to resources is
directly correlated with having unsuccessful or problematic outcomes with
kids—at least, a greater chance of a problematic outcome with kids.4 And
yet, of course, appropriately, our public policy response to parents that have
not very much access to resources is to try to give them more support, or at
least to try to reinforce their ability to parent their own children, rather than
saying, “You’re poor? You shouldn’t get married. We’re not going to let
you get married, because you’re going to have less good outcomes with
your kids.”

3. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 1, at 33–36, which describes the children of same-sex
couples as suffering from “parental absence” and projects onto kids raised by loving samesex couples the greater risk of poor outcomes experienced by kids from homes characterized
by divorce or single parenthood. See also, e.g., Lynn Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption
Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323,
324–25 (2005) (conflating the “parentlessness” of children raised by same-sex couples with
the circumstances of orphans, homeless persons, and “children in refugee camps”). To
eliminate any possibility of confusion, the text in quotation marks in the body of the Essay
above is a stylized account of the arguments made by Professor Wardle and others, not a
direct quote from the cited articles.
4. See, e.g., Lamb Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 16 (explaining that “poverty and social
isolation [are] associated with maladjustment” while “adequate resources support[] healthy
adjustment”).
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It constitutes a sort of magical thinking on the part of antigay advocates
that, if you can point to some supposed deficit on the part of gay parents—
which, once again, is invented and indeed a misuse of social science data—
then that is a reason to deny them equal treatment under law, because
somehow they’re not going to have kids if you just deny them equal
treatment under law and otherwise don’t take them into account under law.
But of course, gay parents exist, and gay parents are going to exist whether
we give them equal treatment under our laws or not. The question that we
should be addressing is, what is the best way to support these parents in
light of the social realities in which they live? And the social reality in
which they live is that their sex and sexual orientation have nothing to do
with their ability to have successful outcomes with their kids.
Perhaps even more important, there is this seeming willingness on the
part of antigay advocates to go around calling LGBT people unfit parents,
and to expect to be treated with courtesy in response. I’ve been doing this
for a dozen years, and I have to tell you, in very personal terms: I’m getting
a little tired of being courteous in response to this kind of argument.
A second species of argument that gets deployed in these conversations a
lot is associated with what are often called the New Natural Lawyers—a
group of scholars and advocates in the Academy most strongly identified
with Robbie George at Princeton, in the advocacy world most strongly
identified with the National Organization for Marriage, which is an antigay
organization that Robbie George had a lot to do with founding. Here, this is
an attempt to take natural law arguments, update them to a twenty-first
century vocabulary, and then apply them to current issues of social
disputation.
I’ve read a good deal of the work of Robbie George in this field. It is
extraordinarily erudite work. Robbie George is a very smart man, he writes
very analytically complicated and dense work. And it is analytically
complicated and dense work that has two characteristics that are particularly
relevant to this discussion. First of all, George makes a point of
differentiating his work from the work of other natural law writers who
have justified legal regulation based on a sociological assessment of the
content of majoritarian moral sentiment—the Lord Devlin approach to
natural law analysis from the Devlin-Hart debates5—or that is more
explicitly tied to Catholic doctrine and to the Christian tradition, which of
course is the tradition in which Thomas Aquinas was writing.6 Robbie
George makes a big point of saying, “I am writing about moral propositions
that I believe to be self-evident or at least rationally derivable and these are
simply correct moral propositions. And so I am now going to set forth

5. See LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965) (collecting
Devlin’s lectures on the subject).
6. Aquinas develops his theories on natural law in the Prima Secundae of the Summa.
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Parts I–II (Fathers of the English Dominican
Republic, trans., Encyc. Britannica 1952).

13_WOLFF_P.829-836

834

10/23/2012 6:55 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

arguments about policy prescriptions that we should adopt because they
represent correct moral judgments.”7
He goes on to talk about gay people and gay relationships. And what
Robbie George says about gay people and gay relationships is that we are
base, and we are degraded, and we are morally evil, and we are unfit for
human beings in the ways in which we conduct our relationships.8
Now, in fairness, Robbie George is fairly ecumenical in his
condemnation. He also has some similar things to say about fornicators,
about sodomists (including married sodomists), and about masturbators.9 I
must admit, when I was reading his work and came across this last term, it
took me aback, because it is a way of classifying human beings that had not
occurred to me—that somehow, the category of people for whom
masturbation is a meaningful part of their lives is a meaningfully distinct
category. And it is work that, for all of its genuine learning and
intelligence, betrays a kind of fearful and desperate sexual repression,
which on one level provokes a reaction of human compassion. I must say
that, in reading George’s work, I have a powerful reaction of compassion.

7. Professor George sets forth his approach to natural law theory most fully in MAKING
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993). Thus, for example, in
differentiating his work from that of Lord Devlin, George writes, “I argue that Devlin’s
defense of morals legislation should be rejected just in so far as it deviates from the
traditional and correct view that morals laws are morally justified only when the morality
they enforce is true.” Id. at 5. Professor George writes in a similar vein in a recent collection
of essays:
The thesis I set before you is that a key source of the pathologies afflicting
marriage in contemporary societies is not . . . the substitute of reason for tradition
[but rather] the significant erosion . . . of a sound understanding of marriage . . . .
The problem, in other words, is that many people have lost their grip on the nature
of the marital good, or goods, and on the reasons for marrying and supporting
marriage that these goods supply. The failure is precisely a failure of practical
understanding—of reason.
Robert P. George, Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 147–
48 (Robert P. George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006). Once again, to eliminate any
possibility of confusion, the text in quotations marks in the body of the Essay above is my
own account of George’s approach and not a direct quote from his work.
8. Professor George explores these ideas at great length in ROBERT P. GEORGE &
PATRICK LEE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND POLITICS (2008). See,
e.g., id. at 176–77 (“[N]onmarital sexual acts (including homosexual acts) are intrinsically
incapable of actualizing or promoting a genuine human good. . . . [and] are always in
principle contrary to intrinsic personal goods . . . and as such harm the character of those
freely choosing to engage in them.”); id. at 178 (intimacy between same-sex couples “is a
degradation of persons”); id. at 186 (describing the intimacy of a same-sex couple as
“[s]exual acts done for the sole immediate purpose of pleasure, and not intended as
embodying, expressing, or symbolizing personal communion” and hence constituting
“masturbatory sex [that] is objectively morally wrong”); id. at 188 (“Masturbatory sex is a
choice to use one’s sexuality (and perhaps that of others) as a mere means toward pleasure
and thus involves treating one’s sexuality (and perhaps others’ sexuality) as a mere object for
use and as subpersonal.”); id. at 189 (“[Mutual masturbatory sex] involves treating a bodily
person as if he or she were not a person, for here the sexuality of the person, which includes
both the body and personal expression, is used as a mere extrinsic means.”).
9. See id. at 188 (“masturbator”), 194–96 (“sodomy”), 196–97 (“fornication”).
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But I also have a reaction of having to take a step back, if you’ll permit
me to say it colloquially, and to ask myself: Exactly how far do I have to
extend the norms of collegiality to be engaging with somebody whose
entire work is based upon the assertion that, as a rational moral proposition,
I am base, and degraded, and morally evil, and behaving in a way that is not
fit for a human being?
The third species of argument that I think warrants some critical attention
is often termed “complementarity,” sometimes called “gender integration”
in relationships. This is, if I may say so, a rather opportunistically coined
set of phrases that are seeking to discuss the inherent need or the inherent
importance or value of having two people of different genders in a
marriage, and that that is somehow essentially what a marriage is about.
Robbie George writes about this as well and many others do, there are
Catholic scholars who write about this in recent disputation about social
issues.10
Scholars who emphasize this notion of complementarity make a point of
saying that they are emphasizing differences in the complementary qualities
of men and women not just in their physical characteristics but also in their
intellectual, their emotional, and their spiritual characteristics.11 It is these
large sources of difference and complementarity, they say, that we ought to
be recognizing in order to say that marriage is a unique relationship.12
Now, number one, of course, this species of argument transparently and
almost brazenly accentuates the nature of the sex classification in sexdifferentiated marriage laws. I find it astonishing that these are the same
people who are arguing either in their scholarly work or in court that—
despite this “complementarity,” “gender integrated” set of assertions about
the inherent nature of men and women on intellectual, emotional, and
spiritual levels as well as physical levels—that discrimination in the
marriage laws based upon sex does not constitute a classification that
should be enforceable under the Equal Protection Clause.

10. See, e.g., Roger Scruton, Sacrilege and Sacrament, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE,
supra note 7, at 25–28 (2006); Lynn Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance,
Purpose and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 291 (2011) (“Gender
integration, uniting a man and woman in a gender-complementary union, is an essential,
perhaps the most indispensable, purpose of marriage.”).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schiltz, Does Sarah + John = 3? The History and Future of
Complementarity in Catholic Feminism, Keynote Memorial Lecture at The Family:
Searching for the Fairest Love, Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Ninth Annual
Fall Conference (Nov. 7, 2008), available at https://sites.google.com/a/nd.edu/the-notredame-center-for-ethics-and-culture/video/fall-conference-videos/the-family-searching-forfairest-love-videos (emphasizing the complementarity of men and women in their physical,
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual characteristics in seeking to articulate a Catholic
feminist worldview).
12. See, e.g., George, supra note 7, at 151 (“The bodily union of [opposite-sex] spouses
in marital acts is the biological matrix of their marriage as a comprehensive, multilevel
sharing of life: that is, a relationship that unites the spouses at the bodily (biological),
emotional, dispositional, and even spiritual levels of their being.”).
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But, more broadly, I don’t disregard the notion that there is something
distinctive about having a relationship with two people of opposite sexes,
and having them explore their differences of experience as part of what it is
that they are doing as they travel through the world together. Just as I take
very seriously that there is something distinctive and beautiful and
important about two people of the same sex sharing experiences through a
common lens, through a common set of shared understandings of what the
demands of the world are upon them in their gender and the ways in which
they do or don’t experience those demands in a similar fashion. The
complementarity argument simply takes as a given that the opposite-sex
experience is the one that public policy ought to be accentuating, and that
the same-sex experience is simply to be differentiated through the
construction of an argument, rather than to be taken seriously on its own
terms.
That kind of not being taken seriously—having that be the starting point
that one has to begin with in engaging in a collegial fashion with these
arguments—over time it has a corrosive impact upon one’s individual
dignity. The question is what to do about that.
Now, I have run out of time, so I’m not going to spend a lot of time
talking about what to do about it. I’ll just say quickly: One can refuse to
engage with these arguments and the people who make them, which is a
choice that some LGBT scholars make and is a choice that has obvious
costs associated with it. One can continue engaging in a collegial fashion,
which is the choice that I have made for most of my career, but carries
serious individual costs. Or one can engage with a somewhat sharperedged critique of the nature of the arguments that are being made, which is
part of what, of course, I am doing today, which has its own set of costs and
disruptions of the normal collegial atmosphere about it. I acknowledge that.
But I think that the impact upon the individual dignity of LGBT scholars
from having to confront these ugly, ugly arguments over and over again is
something that needs to be acknowledged as one of the central, central
dynamics that warrants attention in conversations about these issues.
Thank you.

